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This paper examines the division of founder shares in entrepreneurial ventures, focusing on the decision
of whether or not to divide the shares equally among all founders. To motivate the empirical analysis
we develop a simple theory of costly bargaining, where founders trade off the simplicity of accepting
an equal split, with the costs of negotiating a differentiated allocation of founder equity. We test the
predictions of the theory on a proprietary dataset comprised of 1,476 founders in 511 entrepreneurial
ventures. The empirical analysis consists of three main steps. First we consider determinants of equal
splitting. We identify three founder characteristics –idea generation, prior entrepreneurial experience
and founder capital contributions – regarding which greater team heterogeneity reduces the likelihood
of equal splitting. Second, we show that these same founder characteristics also significantly affect
the share premium in teams that split the equity unequally. Third, we show that equal splitting is associated
with lower pre-money valuations in first financing rounds. Further econometric tests suggest that,
as predicted by the theory, this effect is driven by unobservable heterogeneity, and it is more pronounced
in teams that make quick decisions about founder share allocations. In addition we perform some counterfactual
calculations that estimate the amount of money ‘left on the table’ by stronger founders who agree to
an equal split. We estimate that the value at stake is approximately 10% of the firm equity, 25% of
the average founder stake, or $450K in net present value.
Thomas F. Hellmann
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University of British Columbia
2053 Main Mall












Sooner or later every entrepreneurial team has to face a tough decision of how to divide founder shares. 
This can be difficult because it requires founders to assess the relative value of each other’s 
contributions. A simple solution is to value all members equally; this avoids making value judgments 
and requires minimal negotiation. However, an equal split of founder equity may not always be 
appropriate, for some founders may feel like there are contributing relatively more and thus expect to 
receive more shares. This paper examines the division of founder shares in entrepreneurial ventures, 
focusing on the decision of whether or not to divide the shares equally among all founders.  
Founding teams adopt a variety of approaches to splitting the ownership among themselves. For 
instance, at Pandora Radio (originally known as Savage Beast), an online music company that was 
founded by three people who had few a priori differences between them regarding their expected 
contributions to the venture, the team split the equity quickly and equally (Wasserman et al., 2008b).  At 
Ockham Technologies, where there were significant differences in the backgrounds of the three 
founders, the team engaged in a detailed negotiation over equity stakes and ended up deciding on an 
unequal split (Wasserman, 2003b).  In this paper we provide a theory and some empirical evidence to 
explain under what circumstances founders choose to split their shares equally, the process of how they 
reach that decision, and how this decision may be related to subsequent outcomes. 
Given the paucity of prior research on this topic, we develop a simple theoretical model of the central 
issues involved in founder equity splits. The model includes negotiation frictions, based on the cost (or 
discomfort) of valuing relative differences. It generates three sets of empirical predictions: (i) larger 
teams and teams with more heterogeneous founders are less likely to agree on an equal split; (ii) the 
same founder characteristics whose team-level heterogeneity predicts fewer equal splits, also affect 
individual share allocations in case of unequal splitting; and (iii) equal splitting is associated with lower 
valuations, for reasons discussed below. 
We test these predictions on a unique, proprietary dataset comprised of 1,476 founders in 511 private 
ventures. A major barrier to studying the allocation of founder equity has been lack of data; standard 
datasets lack information about founders’ initial ownership of their ventures, at least in part because of 
the sensitivity of such data, and fail to include such factors as the duration of the negotiation over equity  
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splits. To get past these barriers, we use data from the annual CompStudy survey of Technology and 
Life Sciences ventures in North America. The CompStudy survey was first conducted in 2000, and over 
the last decade, has become a standard annual reference for private-venture boards and CEOs regarding 
executive-compensation benchmarks. In 2008 and 2009, the CompStudy survey added detailed 
questions about founding teams and their equity splits. These data serve as the core of the empirical 
section of this paper, and enable us to begin opening the black box of founders’ equity allocations. 
As a starting point we compare the actual percentage of founder shares received against the benchmark 
of an equal split. We define share premium = equity share – (1/N), where N is the number of founders in 
the venture. Figure 1 shows the distribution of share premia in our data. The most striking fact about this 
distribution is the spike at zero. Indeed, approximately one third of all founding teams simply decide to 
split the equity equally. Our objective is thus to understand the underlying reasons for this curious base 
finding. 
Our empirical analysis is comprised of three main steps, closely following the theory’s empirical 
implications. The first step is to explain the determinants of equal splitting. The theory suggests that 
larger teams are less likely to split the equity equally, and the data clearly supports this hypothesis. The 
theory suggests that equal splitting is less likely when there is more heterogeneity within the founding 
team. Our data allow us to consider four founder characteristics: years of work experience, prior 
founding experience (a.k.a. serial entrepreneurs), whether they contributed to the founding idea, and 
capital invested in the venture. We find that greater team heterogeneity in entrepreneurial experience, 
idea generation and capital contributions predict a lower probability of equal splitting. The theory also 
predicts more equal splitting when negotiation costs are high. We think of these not only in terms of 
direct cost (time and resources spent on negotiating) but mostly in terms of indirect costs, especially in 
terms of social barriers to evaluating differences. This social-cost interpretation is supported by a finding 
that teams where founders are related through family are more likely to do an equal split. Teams with 
more experienced founders are also less likely to split the equity equally.  
The second step of the analysis focuses on the subset of teams that split the equity unequally, to analyze 
the determinants of founders’ share premia. Our theory predicts that the same founder characteristics 
whose heterogeneity measures affect unequal splitting should also affect the size of the share premium 
among unequal splitters. Indeed, we find that prior entrepreneurial experience, contributing to the 
founding idea and investing capital are all associated with higher share premia.   
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The third step of the empirical analysis examines how equal splitting is related to valuation. We find a 
negative relationship between equal splitting and the pre-money valuation at the time of a first round of 
outside financing. Our theoretical model predicts such a negative relationship, not because of a direct 
causal effect but because of a “stakes effect” (founders are less hesitant to initiate negotiation when the 
stakes are high) and what we call a “negotiator effect” (better entrepreneurs are keen negotiators, both 
with outsider stakeholders and with each other). In this case a team’s refusal to negotiate an unequal 
split may reveal an underlying weakness, a lack of entrepreneurial negotiation skills. Negotiating skills 
are obviously not directly observable, but we consider an indirect test, where we decompose the decision 
to split the equity into an expected and an unexpected component, arguing that the negotiator effect 
should work through the unexpected component. We indeed find that the relationship between equal 
splitting and valuation is driven by the unexpected component, and that the expected component has no 
explanatory power. This is consistent with unobserved heterogeneity, such as a negotiator effect. 
We also examine the speed with which a team negotiates its division of equity. In our sample, 47% of all 
teams report that they agreed on an equity split within a day or less. Our theoretical model suggests that 
quick negotiations are associated with equal splitting, something we indeed find in the data. 
Furthermore, the theory suggests that the negative relationship between equal splitting and valuation 
should be concentrated among quick negotiators, which is supported by the empirical evidence. This last 
finding is particular striking, because it shows that processes deep inside the entrepreneurial venture 
might still be related to financial outcomes such as firm valuation. 
We also consider the possibility that some teams have a distinct preference for equal splitting. This 
could be because of a desire to balance control rights, especially avoiding one founder’s obtaining a 
majority of shares. Or it could be that founders have ‘other-regarding’ preferences (sometimes also 
called altruism or a preference for equality; see Fehr and Schmidt (2006)) that value equality by itself. 
We first show that such benefits of equal splitting are easily incorporated into our theoretical framework. 
We then provide some preliminary evidence that suggests that equal splitting is positively correlated 
with a preference to balance founder representation on the board of directors, consistent with the control 
argument. It is also positive correlated with equality of founder salaries and bonus targets, which is 
consistent with theories of other-regarding preferences. 
In the final section of the paper we perform some counterfactual calculations to gauge how much money 
is at stake when a team decides to forgo negotiations and accept an equal split. Any such calculations  
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require bold assumptions, so we provide a variety of alternative approaches. Overall we find that the 
decision to allocate founder shares equally does not appear to be economically trivial. 
Although we are not aware of any other paper that looks inside the black box of founder equity splits, 
our analysis still builds on a variety of prior literatures. The recent finance literature has emphasized that 
in order to understand a firm’s financial structure, it is important to go back to the very beginnings of the 
firm (Kaplan et al., 2004; Lemmon et al., 2010). The work of Robb and Robinson (2009) also 
recognizes the importance of insiders (i.e., founders) in the capital structure of entrepreneurial firms. 
Hauswald and Hege (2006) examine ownership and control rights for joint ventures between established 
firms, and find a high incidence of equal share divisions.
4 The problem of dividing shares is closely 
related to the “division of a pie” problem that has been studied extensively in game-theoretic literature 
(e.g., Binmore et al., 1986; Rubinstein, 1982). Interestingly, some of the recent game-theoretic literature 
examines why identical parties may still not always agree on an equal division (Ashlagiy et al., 2008), 
whereas we are concerned with the question of why non-identical founders agree on an equal division. A 
small economics literature also discusses equal compensation for unequal agents (Bose et al., 2010; 
Encinosa et al., 2007). Finally, there is an organizational literature that examines the social factors that 
affect the formation of founding teams (e.g., Ruef et al., 2003).  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we develop a simple theoretical model 
and discuss its empirical implications. In section 3 we describe the CompStudy survey from which the 
data are taken, and explain the variables used in the empirical analyses. Section 4 examines the 
determinants of equal splitting. Section 5 analyzes determinants of individual share premia. Section 6 
studies the relationship between equal splitting and valuations. Section 7 considers potential non-
pecuniary benefits of equal splitting. Section 8 estimates the value at stake using counterfactual 
calculations. Section 9 briefly concludes. 
Section 2: Theoretical Motivation 
In this section we discuss the theoretical foundation and develop a simple formal model. Rather than 
seeking to develop a complex theory, we try to develop the simplest possible model to guide and 





interpret the empirical evidence. Suppose there are N founders, indexed by i=1,…,N. Founders need to 
decide how to split their venture’s equity. They have imperfect information about the exact value each 
founder contributes to the venture, and face the following simple choice. Either they negotiate equity 
stakes, which requires that each founder incurs private costs k, or they all forgo those costs and simply 
split the equity equally. We assume that without negotiation costs, an equal split is the only focal point, 
i.e., it is not possible to negotiate an unequal split without incurring negotiation costs. We justify this by 
saying that any agreement on an unequal split requires founders to agree about how to value their 
respective differences, which is likely to involve some costly negotiation. The private costs k should be 
interpreted broadly, to include not only the time and resources devoted to evaluating differences among 
founders, but also the psychological costs and social impediments of discussing who contributes more 
value.
5  
There are three dates in the model. At date 0, the two founders have to decide whether or not to evaluate 
their differences. If they evaluate them, they incur the costs k, learn about the respective differences, and 
negotiate an equity split at date 1. If they don’t evaluate their differences at date 0, they simple agree to 
an equal split at date 1. At date 2 the value of the venture, denoted by π, is revealed. 
Consider the negotiation at time 1. For simplicity we assume that the founders bargain according to the 
Nash-Shapley bargaining value, although nothing depends on this. After incurring costs k, founders have 
common knowledge about their relative value-added to the venture, and split the equity according to Si = 
1/N + Δi, where Si denotes the percentage share received by the individual-founders and Δi is the share 
premium, resulting from the Nash-Shapley value. We will discuss the determinants of Δi in the empirical 
part of the paper. 
If founders incur k, Δi becomes observable to all at date 1. At date 0, however, the founders only 
observe an imperfect signal, given by δi= Δi+εi. δi represents each founder’s initial belief about his/her 
own value contribution, prior to going through an extensive process of communicating and evaluating 
this belief with his/her partner(s). We assume that εi are drawn independently from a common 
distribution. To obtain simple analytical expressions we use the uniform distribution over the interval [-
u,u], where u≥Max|Δi|. Note that this distribution satisfied the condition E(εi)=0, so that each partner has 






an unbiased belief about his/her relative value-added. A recent literature argues that entrepreneurs are 
optimists (Puri et al., 2007). It is straightforward to extend the model to allow for optimistic founders 
who have biased beliefs about their value contribution. This would require a distribution with E(εi)>0, 
and imply that optimistic entrepreneurs are more likely to demand negotiation, and therefore less likely 
to split the equity equally. 
We assume that at date 0, each partner has a choice of either accepting an equal split, which has the 
advantage of forgoing the evaluation costs k, or demanding a negotiation about equity splits. Even if 
only one partner demands negotiation, all have to incur k. The decision to demand negotiation is 
therefore given by a trade-off between the expected gains from negotiation versus the cost of bargaining. 
Formally, a partner asks for negotiation whenever δiπ > k, where π represents the founders’ (rational) 
expectations of the future value of their company.
6 Using δiπ < k  εi<(k/π)–Δi and using the properties 
of the uniform distribution, the probability that founder i does not ask for negotiation is given by 
[u+(k/π)–Δi]/2u. The probability of equal splitting at date 0 is given by the probability that none of the 
founders ask for negotiation, given by θ = Prob[εi<(k/π)–Δi for all i] = Πi=1,...,N[u+(k/π)-Δi]/(2u)
N. 
The equilibrium of this model is as follows. At date 0, each partner observes his/her signal δi. They split 
the equity equally with probability θ. However, with probability 1-θ, at least one of the partners 
demands negotiation. In that case, all partners incur evaluation costs k. They discover their true 
differences Δi and split the equity according to Si = 1/N + Δi.  
We now use this simple model to derive some empirical implications. Our discussion explicitly 
acknowledges that as econometricians we only observe a subset of the information available to the 
agents in the model. Moreover, to empirically explain equal splitting we could trivially assume that there 
exists a large portion of teams with Δi=0. However, this amounts to assuming rather than explaining 
equal splitting. Instead, we assume that there is a non-degenerate distribution of Δi‘s, so that the case of 
Δi=0 is a measure zero event. This means that our model only predicts equal splitting for teams that do 
not incur evaluation costs. We will return to this assumption later. 
Consider first the role of team size. In our model, when one founder demands negotiation, the entire 
team ends up having to engage in the negotiation. Intuitively this suggests that larger teams are less 





likely to end up with an equal split. Consider the effect of adding a N+1
th founder to a team of N. For 
simplicity, suppose that the additional founder does not perturb the relative value-added of the other 
founders, i.e., ΔN+1=0. In that case, using obvious notation, we have θN+1 = Πi=1,...,N+1[u+(k/π)-
Δi]/(2u)
(N+1) so that θN+1/θN=[u+(k/π)]/2u<1. Moreover, because of the strict inequality, this result 
continues to hold in a neighborhood of ΔN+1=0. For teams with comparable levels of heterogeneity we 
state the first Empirical Implication. 
Empirical Implication 1 (Team size): Larger teams have a lower probability of equal splitting. 
Next we turn our attention to the negotiation costs k. We immediately note that the higher k, the greater 
the probability of equal splitting.
7 Again, as econometricians we cannot directly observe the value of k, 
but we may be able to identify some covariates that we denote by KT – the subscript T refers to the fact 
that this variable varies at the team level.  
Empirical Implication 2 (Evaluation costs): If there are team-specific covariates KT that are positively 
related to the evaluation costs k, then higher values of KT are associated with a higher probability of 
equal splitting. 
Let us now examine the role of founder heterogeneity. For this consider any distribution of Δi’s and 
consider a change where one founder’s Δi increases while that of another founder, who has a smaller Δi, 
decreases.
8 Without loss of generality we focus on founders 1 and 2 with Δ1 > Δ2 and we denote the 
increase in heterogeneity by some small σ > 0. Using obvious notation, we have Δ’1 = Δ1 + σ > Δ1 > Δ2 
> Δ2 – σ = Δ’2. Straightforward calculations reveal that dθ/dσ < 0.
9 This says that greater heterogeneity 
among founders (as measured by an increase in σ) decreases the probability of equal splitting. The Δi’s 
are again not observable to the econometrician. Let Xi be an observable covariate that varies at the 
individual-founder level and let HT(Xi) be a measure of the heterogeneity of this covariate within the 
team. Suppose that the covariate Xi is relevant to the share premium Δi then we obtain the following 
prediction. 









Empirical Implication 3 (Team heterogeneity): The greater the heterogeneity HT(Xi), the lower the 
probability of equal splitting θ. 
In addition to making predictions for the probability of equal splits, our model also makes predictions 
about the share premium Δi.
10  
Empirical Implication 4 (Share premium): If for a covariates Xi the heterogeneity HT(Xi) lowers the 
probability of equal splitting θ, then Xi also affects the individual share premium Δi, and vice versa.  
Empirical Implication 4 says that the covariates that affect the share premium at the individual level are 
the same as the covariates whose heterogeneity affects the probability of equal splitting at the team 
level.  
Finally we explore the relationship between the equity split decision and the value π of the company. 
Empirically we will measure π through a company’s financial valuation. Our model suggests two 
reasons why equal splitting may be associated with lower valuations. First, it is easy to see that there is a 
direct negative effect of π on θ.
11 This is because teams that expect to have more profitable ventures are 
less likely to agree on an equal split. We call this the “stakes effect,” and it says that founding teams 
with greater expectations have stronger incentives to negotiate their initial allocation of equity.  
In addition to the “stakes” effect, we consider a second effect that we call the “negotiator” effect. The 
simple intuition is that keen negotiators make better entrepreneurs and also bargain harder among 
themselves. Put differently, entrepreneurs who obtain better deals by negotiating hard with their 
customers, suppliers, employees or investors may also be more inclined to negotiate among themselves. 
This suggests that negotiation costs are negative related to team quality. More formally, we assume that 
there is an unobservable quality parameter (μ, interpreted as the willingness to negotiate hard) that 
generates higher profits (i.e., π is increasing in μ) and at the same time is associated with lower 
negotiation costs (i.e., k is decreasing in μ). 




2)] < 0.  
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Note that neither the stakes nor the negotiator effects imply a causal relationship between equal splits 
and lower valuations. In fact, the stakes effect reflects what econometricians refer to as reverse causality, 
whereas the negotiator effect is a case of unobserved heterogeneity.  
Empirical Implication 5 (Valuation). Equal splitting is associated with lower valuations because of a 
“stakes effect” where teams that expect a higher valuation have stronger reasons to negotiate an 
unequal split; and because of a “negotiator” effect where k is a decreasing function of team quality μ, 
so that an equal split becomes a sign of lower team quality. 
Our final set of empirical implications concerns the importance of negotiation itself. Our basic model 
set-up suggests that quick (slow) negotiation is associated with equal (unequal) splitting. Finding 
empirically a positive correlation between equal splitting and quick negotiation would thus confirm the 
fundamental premise of the model.
12 Moreover, combining this insight with Empirical Prediction 5 
suggest that equal splitting with or without lengthy negotiations represent two distinct economic 
outcomes. In particular, the negative association between equal splitting and valuation that emerges 
from Empirical Implication 5 should only pertain to quick equal splitting, but not to equal splitting after 
lengthy negotiations. 
Empirical Implication 6 (Negotiation speed and valuation): If an equal split emerges from a quick 
negotiation it is associated with a lower valuation than if it emerges from a lengthy negotiation process. 
Section 3: Data and variables 
3.1: Data sources 
The data for this paper come from the annual CompStudy survey of private American ventures, for 
which one author is the lead investigator (see Wasserman, 2003a, 2006; 2011 for more details). The first 
CompStudy survey was conducted in 2000 with 211 private information technology ventures (broadly 
defined, including telecommunications). Two years later a parallel survey of life sciences ventures was 









added, and since then, annual surveys of both industries have been conducted.
13 The list of target 
companies is generated by combining the list of private companies included in the VentureXpert 
database with the membership lists of local technology associations (e.g., the Massachusetts Technology 
Council). Invitations are sent to the CEOs and CFOs of those companies, and participants are 
encouraged to provide additional names of companies that meet the survey selection criteria.
14 To 
encourage participation in the survey, participants are offered a free copy of a detailed “CompStudy 
Compensation Report” that is based on the survey results and made available only to participants. The 
report includes detailed position-by-position breakdowns of salaries, bonuses, and equity holdings for 
the eleven most common C-level and VP-level positions in private ventures. The breakdowns provide 
compensation benchmarks by industry segment, geographic location, company size and age, financing 
rounds, founder versus non-founder status, and other metrics collected in the survey. Over the last 
decade, CompStudy’s annual compensation reports have become a standard reference within the top 
management teams of private American ventures and for the board members and investors who are 
involved with those ventures. 
The dataset used in this paper combines the Technology and Life Sciences surveys from 2008-2009, 
while controlling for the industry of each participant. A major benefit of conducting annual surveys, and 
of collecting one’s own data, is that each year the researcher can add new questions to tackle emerging 
research questions that aren’t addressed by existing datasets (e.g., about the equity-split negotiation 
process) or are highly confidential (e.g., about the percentage of equity received by each founder). For 
the 2008 CompStudy survey, we added detailed questions about each founding team, its prior work 
experience and relationships, and the equity split within the team. These questions were repeated in the 
2009 survey. The dataset for this paper combines the survey responses from both 2008 and 2009, in both 
the technology and life sciences industries. Across those two surveys, we received responses from a total 
of 576 multi-founder teams. Dropping 65 repeat respondents in 2009, we arrive at our full dataset of 511 
ventures and 1,476 founders (an average of 2.9 founders per venture). 









Each year, survey response rates vary between 10%-20%, higher than the typical response rates for 
surveys of similar firms and targeting similar levels of executives (e.g., Graham et al., 2001). The 
surveys are conducted online so that fields can be validated as they are being entered. When possible, 
data are cross-checked with publicly-available information sources to validate the accuracy of the 
submissions. Each year, the survey data are checked for representativeness against the VentureXpert 
population. Regarding geographic distributions and industry segments, the dataset is a representative 
sample of private high-potential ventures in the technology and life sciences industries within the United 
States. Regarding age of venture, the dataset contains slightly younger companies given that 
VentureXpert only includes ventures that have raised institutional capital while our dataset also includes 
pre-funding ventures (9% of our sample).  
Compared to a sample of public companies, this dataset should be far less susceptible to survivor biases. 
Our survey design allows us to capture companies at a very early stage, but it is still not possible to 
sample companies at birth, or before. Indeed, our analysis starts at a point in time where teams have 
been formed, so that we cannot analyze the process of how teams are formed. Clearly team formation is 
not random, but our research question does not require random assignment of founders to teams. On the 
contrary, we are interested in examining how those founders who are actually starting a company split 
the equity. 
The standard concern with not sampling at birth is the possibility that the sample suffers from some 
survivorship bias. Given the unique nature of our data, no out-of-sample comparison is feasible. 
However, we can perform a within-sample test for survivor bias. Specifically, we analyze whether in our 
sample older ventures differ from younger ventures with regards to our two core dependent variables, 
the team-level equal-split dummy and (the absolute value of) the individual-level share premium 
received by each founder. We use t-tests of median split sub-samples of the dataset, splitting the 
ventures into 252 “older ventures” and 259 “younger ventures.” If there is strong survivor bias in the 
sample, we would expect to see differences in these variables between the younger ventures and the 
older ventures, but we find no such bias. For the younger ventures, 32.0% had split the equity equally 
(standard deviation of 0.468); for the older ventures, 34.9% had split the equity equally (standard 
deviation of .478), with the t-test for difference being insignificant. Likewise, a t-test of the absolute 
value of the founder-level share premium (for the younger ventures, a mean of 9.2 and standard  
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deviation of 11.3; for the older ventures, a mean of 10.2 and standard deviation of 13.0) found no 
significant difference between older ventures and younger ventures. 
Another sample selection issue concerns the question of exactly who gets counted as a founder. For our 
main analysis we use the self-reported data, but as a robustness check we also examined whether our 
main results could be affected by some unusual team definitions. There are two types of gray areas in 
the data. First, some founders join a while after founding, making them look more like non-founding 
executives. Second, some founders receive very low equity stakes, making them look more like 
employees. As a robustness check we removed from the sample all teams that had (i) any “founders” 
who joined more than two years after the first founder, and/or (ii) any founders with an equity stake that 
was more than 70% below the equal stake.
15 We found that this did not change the main insights of the 
analysis. 
3.2: Empirical variables 
Appendix 1 summarizes our core variables, their definitions, and the specific survey question used for 
each variable. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics. Panel A shows the statistics for the team-level 
variables, and also separates the sample into teams that split the equity equally versus unequally. Panel 
B shows the descriptive statistics for the individual-founder variables, also separated into teams that split 
equally versus unequally. Table 2 reports the pair-wise correlation between the main variables of 
interest, Panel A at the team level and Panel B at the individual-founder level. 
Our core dependent variables capture the allocation of equity within the founding teams. Our raw data 
include for each co-founder the specific percentage of equity received. Our initial analyses focus on the 
determinants of whether teams split the equity equally versus unequally. We use a binary variable of 
whether the team split the equity equally (i.e., all founders received the same percentage) or unequally. 
This binary variable is the basis for estimating the probability of an equal split, as captured by θ in the 
theory model.
 At the individual-founder level, to analyze the determinants of the percentage received by 
each founder we use the share premium, defined as the actual equity stake minus the equal stake (which 
is 1/N where N is the number of founders in the venture). This measures the deviation from the focal 





outcome of an equal split, and corresponds to the Δi’s in the theory. Figure 1 shows the distribution of 
the share premium across the entire sample.
16 
Another important dependent variable is the pre-money valuation received by the venture during its first 
round of outside financing. While the post-money valuation is a measure of the total company value 
after completion of the round, the pre-money valuation is a more appropriate measure of the value 
actually captured by the founders.  
Most economic theories would argue that the allocation of equity is a forward-looking decision, so that 
the optimal allocation depends largely on parameters that affect the fundamental problem of moral 
hazard in teams (Holmstrom, 1982). Unfortunately these parameters, such as the relative effort elasticity 
and the relative productivity of the different founders, are empirically hard to observe. Instead we have 
to contend with more objective measures of founder differences that are observable at the time of 
founding. While these variables may appear to be backward looking (e.g., founder X has prior 
entrepreneurial experience) they typically contain relevant forward looking information (e.g., founder X 
is more productive because of prior experience).  
The independent variables include individual-founder and team-level variables. At the individual-
founder level, we have four main variables: work experience, entrepreneurial experience, ideas and 
capital. Those correspond to the Xi’s in the theory model.  
Evans and Leighton (1989) suggest that education has greater returns in self-employment than in wage 
work, suggesting an important role for human capital in entrepreneurial firms. In addition, prior 
entrepreneurial experience may be particularly important (Gompers et al., 2010). Thus, our individual-
founder variables include two measures of human capital: the founder’s years of work experience prior 
to founding the current venture, and whether the founder had prior founding experience (“serial 
entrepreneur”).  









Our third individual-founder variable captures whether the founder had been responsible for the idea on 
which the venture was founded (“idea person”). There is some debate about the value of bringing an 
idea into a team. The famous Arrow paradox (1962) argues that it is difficult to capture the value of an 
idea, because prior to disclosing an idea, no one is willing to pay for an unknown idea, and after 
disclosure the information has been transmitted so there is no further need to pay for it. The null 
hypothesis is thus that ideas do not affect the division of equity among founders. However, this 
reasoning only acknowledges the backward looking component of idea generation. One resolution of the 
Arrow paradox, suggested by Arora (1996), is that the idea generator also has complementary skills and 
non-codifiable knowledge that makes him/her uniquely valuable to the implementation of the idea. 
Under this hypothesis we would expect the idea generator to command a higher share premium because 
of forward-looking components, such as the creativity and implementation skills that idea generators 
bring into the founding team. 
Our final individual-founder variable captures the financial contributions made by the founders to the 
venture. For each founder, the survey asks whether the amount of capital contributed falls into one of 
five categories: $0k, $1k-$25k, $26k-$100k, $101k-$500k, and More than $500k.
17  
An executive’s economic gains may be influenced by the executive’s position in the organization (e.g., 
Lazear et al., 1981). Thus, we also consider data about the positions held by each of the founders within 
the venture, such as CEO, Chairman, CTO, or other.
18  
The main team variables include the size of the founding team, as well as the team-level versions of the 
individual-founder variables. This includes the team means of the individual-founder variables listed 
above, which we think of as negotiation cost covariates KT. For example, firms with more experienced 
entrepreneurs may have a lower cost of negotiation, because their experience has hardened them to the 












fact that negotiation is part of entrepreneurial life. As a measure of team heterogeneity (i.e., the HT(Xi)) 
we focus on the coefficient of variation of the individual-founder variables. 
We also consider some social impediments to negotiation. Organizational sociologists, such as Uzzi 
(1997) and Granovetter (1985; 2005), have shown how economic transactions are embedded in the prior 
social relationships of the participants in the transaction, with different relationships resulting in 
different transaction outcomes. Subsequent work has shown that, in particular for founding teams, prior 
relationships can have powerful impacts on the team’s early evolution (e.g., Ruef et al., 2003; 
Wasserman et al., 2008a). In our study, the founding team’s prior relationships are categorized into prior 
work experience together, prior founding experience together, prior friends but not coworkers, and 
related to each other at time of founding. In our theoretical framework, we think of these relationship 
variables impacting negotiation costs, i.e., we can think of them as part of the covariates KT. 
Our empirical analysis also includes standard controls for industry, geography and date. Industry 
dummies capture whether the venture is a technology venture versus a life-sciences venture.
19 The 
venture’s location was captured by dummies for the two “entrepreneurship hubs,” in California and 
Massachusetts, and one for non-US participants, namely a small subset of participants from Canada. 
Year dummies were used in the equity-split models to capture the year in which the equity was split, and 
in the financing models for the year in which the first outside round was raised. 
The survey captures the elapsed time over which the founders negotiated the equity split, categorized by: 
1 day or less, 2 days to 2 weeks, 2 weeks to 2 months, 2 months to 6 months, and More than 6 months. 
47% of all teams agreed on an equal split after 1 day or less. This naturally captures our notion of 
forgoing negotiation, so that our analysis uses a dummy variable called “quick negotiation” that takes 
the value 1 if a team agreed on an equal split after 1 day or less, 0 otherwise. 
We also use some additional variables for extensions and robustness checks. We examine four 
additional measures of team equality, concerning salaries, bonuses, board of directors and CEOs. The 
CEO measures come from the usual founder section of the survey, but the three remaining measures 
come from different parts of the survey. This data has three important limitations. First, all the 
compensation and board data is measured at the time of the survey, not at the time that the team 




allocates founder equity. Second, the compensation and board data identifies whether an executive is a 
founder or not, but due to anonymity concerns it cannot be linked to the individual founder data. As a 
consequence we can only link the compensation data to the founder data at the level of the firm. Third, 
the compensation data is only available for 279 out of 511 companies (54.6%), and the board data for 
445 companies (87.1%).  
We use the salary (bonus) data to create a simple dummy variable that takes the value 1 whenever all 
founders receive the same salary (bonus), 0 otherwise. The CEO (board) variable is based on whether 
control is given to a single founder or not. Specifically, the Balanced-CEOs dummy takes the value 1 
either if none of the founders assume the position of CEO, or else if two founders share the CEO title; 0 
otherwise. Only 6 out of 511 teams (1.2%) have Co-CEOs, 83 teams (16.2%) have no CEOs. 80 teams 
(15.7%) have no founders on the board, 126 teams (24.6%) have two or more founders on the board. 
Section 4: Determinants of equal splitting 
Table 3 reports the results from a series of Probit regressions where the dependent variable measures 
whether teams split the equity equally. The first model features industry, geography and year controls, as 
well as the team size variable. We note that the larger the founding team, the more likely it is to split the 
equity unequally (p<0.01). This result remains robust across all specifications, and is consistent with 
Empirical Implication 1. In terms of the control variables, the industry dummies, as well as the year 
dummies which are not reported for brevity’s sake, are never significant. For the geographic controls, 
we find that Canadian teams are more likely to split the equity equally (p<0.1).  
The second model of Table 3 adds team-level variables that are based on the individual-founder 
characteristics – entrepreneurial and work experience, idea generation and founder capital. A higher 
mean level for the former variables reflects greater team experience, which might lower the cost of 
negotiation. For example, if one of the founders is a serial entrepreneur, it is likely that his/her prior 
experience with splitting equity will make the negotiation process easier. Empirical Prediction 2 
suggests that higher mean values reduce the probability of equal splitting. Table 3 shows that this 
argument holds for one of the four variables: teams with higher average work experience are less likely 
to split the equity equally.   
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Table 3 also considers the coefficient of variation as a heterogeneity measure for these variables. 
Empirical Prediction 3 suggests that heterogeneity should reduce the incidence of equal splitting. Table 
3 shows this to be true for three out of four variables: the mix of serial entrepreneurs (p<0.1), idea 
people (p<0.05), and founder capital invested (p<0.01).  
The third model of Table 3 adds some social determinants, focusing on the prior relationships among 
founders. These variables are measured at the team level. The main result is that teams where founders 
are related through family are more likely to split the equity equally (p<0.1). This suggests that close 
social ties may create a barrier to valuing relative differences among founding team members.  
We performed a variety of robustness checks. Using a Logit instead of a Probit model does not affect the 
patterns of results. It may be argued that instead of looking at the mean of the experience variables one 
should consider the maximum. For example, it may be less important that all founders are serial 
entrepreneurs, all that matters is that at least one of them is. We therefore reran Table 3 using maxima 
instead of means, but found again that the only significant variable concerned work experience. Finally, 
for the three categorical variables (serial entrepreneurs, ideas and capital), instead of using the 
coefficient of variation, we considered using entropy as an alternative measure of heterogeneity. The 
results were very similar, except that the p value for the entropy measure of idea heterogeneity fell into 
the range of 0.12 to 0.14.  
 
Section 5: Determinants of individual share premia 
Empirical Prediction 4 concerns the division of equity among non-equal splitters. We focus on four key 
determinants of the share premium, namely whether a founder has prior start-up experience (i.e., serial 
entrepreneur), years of prior work experience, whether the founder contributed to the founding idea, and 
the amount of founding capital provided. Because our theory shows that only relative differences within 
teams matter, we de-mean all of the founder characteristics.  
Model 1 of Table 4 reports the results from an OLS regression, where the standard errors are clustered 
by team. One econometric challenge is that all the share premia within a team necessarily add up to zero. 
This conflicts with the standard assumption of independently distributed errors. A similar problem 
occurs with the estimation of market shares (which always sum to one). The standard solution is to drop  
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one observation per market (or team in our context), which solves the linear dependency (Gaver et al., 
1988).
20 Given the small size of teams, estimation results can be sensitive as to which founder is 
dropped. We therefore re-estimate the model multiple times, dropping one founder per team at random. 
Model 2 reports the results of a bootstrapped OLS regression with one million iterations of randomly 
dropping one founder per team. 
The results in models 1 and 2 are highly consistent. We find that the share premium is higher for serial 
entrepreneurs (p<0.01), for the idea person (p<0.01), and for founders who invest more founding capital 
(p<0.01). However, prior years of work experience do not have a significant impact on the share 
premium. This is consistent with Empirical Implication 4, because the three founder characteristics that 
affect the share premium are exactly the same three characteristics whose heterogeneity at the team level 
predicts unequal splitting. 
In addition to the four founder characteristics, other aspects may affect the division of shares. Of 
particular interest are the managerial positions assumed by the different founders. In Model 3 and 4 of 
Table 4 we add controls for whether each founder is CEO, Chair or CTO. We find a significant share 
premium for the CEO (p<0.01) and for being the chair of the board of directors (p<0.01). Being a CTO 
has a positive but smaller effect on the share premium (p<0.01). The inclusion of founder roles may also 
influence the strength of the coefficients for founder characteristics. We note that the coefficients for 
founder ideas and founder capital remain highly significant. The coefficient for serial entrepreneurs is 
smaller and becomes marginally insignificant in Model 3. Moreover, in that model the negative 
relationship between experience and share premia becomes marginally statistically significant (p<0.1). 
We perform several robustness checks for this model. First, it is possible to add team-level controls such 
as team size. In unreported regressions we added a full set of dummy variables to account for every 
possible team size. We found that all the dummies were insignificant and all the main coefficients 
retained very similar point estimates and significance levels. Upon reflection, this should not be a 
surprise, since the additional controls estimate differences in the average premium when we know that 
the average premium is zero by construction. The same can be said for any other team-level controls. 
Indeed, we also reran the model using team fixed effects and found again that the estimates were very 






similar. Second, we augmented the sample to also include all equal splitters and found that while the 
coefficients were naturally smaller, they still retained their statistical significance. Third, we reran all 
regressions using the relative share premium, defined as (Share – Equal Share) / Equal Share, and 
obtained similar results.  
There are many ways in which the analysis of share premia could be extended, and we plan to further 
explore these in future work. However, what matters for this paper is Empirical Prediction 4, which 
states that those founder variables whose heterogeneity measure affect the probability of equal splitting 




6.1 Base specification 
To examine Empirical Implication 5, we explore the connection between equity splits and financing 
outcomes. As our financing outcome, we focus on (the natural logarithm of) the venture’s pre-money 
valuation. This captures the value of the venture at the time of the investment round, but before the 
capital has been added to the value of the venture. The pre-money valuation is computed by multiplying 
the total founder shares with the price paid by the first round investors, thus measuring the value of the 
founders’ stakes. We limit the analyses to first rounds that occur within three years of the equity split, in 
order to minimize the chances that intervening events might obfuscate the linkages between the 
founders’ equity-split and financing events.
21  
The main independent variable of interest is whether or not a team splits the equity equally. The analysis 
of Table 5 also includes base controls for team size, industry and geography. In terms of time controls, 
we use financing year fixed effects to control for market conditions at the time of financing. In addition, 
we control for the time between when the equity was split and when the venture raised its first outside 
round. It is also possible that the team and social factors analyzed in Table 3 have a direct impact on the 
valuation. In the second model of Table 5 we include them as additional controls. 




The main result from Table 5 is that equal splits have a negative and significant effect on valuation 
(p<0.05). This is consistent with Empirical Implication 5. In terms of magnitudes, the average pre-
money valuation of equal splitters is close to $5M, compared to $5.5M for unequal splitters. We obtain 
very similar magnitudes when evaluating the regression coefficients at the mean. Broadly speaking, 
equal splitters are associated with a valuation discount of approximately 10%.  
The number of observations in Table 5 drops by 42% for three reasons: the valuation is known but 
occurs beyond the 3 year horizon (9% of firms), the valuation is unknown (25% of firms), or the firm 
never raised any outside financing (8%). We first verified that the results continue to hold when we add 
the valuations that occur beyond the three years horizon. We then consider some additional tests for 
whether the remaining missing observations affect the main result. We consider the correlation between 
equal splitting and observing a valuation but find no significant relationship. We then estimate a 
Heckman framework where the outcome regression uses the pre-money valuation as dependent 
variables, just as in Model 1 of Table 5. In the selection equation the dependent variable equals 1 if the 
valuation is observed, 0 otherwise. The selection equation can be specified with or without the 
companies that never obtain outside financing. The independent variables are the usual controls from 
Model 3 of Table 3 (using Model 1 or 2 does not affect the results). We admit that we do not have a 
clever instrument for the selection equation, but note that statistical identification comes from the fact 
that the selection equation uses founding year controls, whereas the outcome regression uses financing 
year controls. We find that the effect of equal splits on valuations remains very similar, always retaining 
statistical significance. Moreover, the estimate of ρ, which measures the correlation of error terms across 
the selection and outcome equation, is statically insignificant, suggesting no significant selection effects. 
Thus we cannot detect any systematic biases between those companies that do or do not report their 
valuations. 
6.2. Unobserved heterogeneity 
Table 5 establishes a relationship between equal splits and pre-money valuation, but we do not claim 
that such a relationship is causal. Our data does not contain a natural experiment. More important, our 
theory emphasizes a non-causal relationship in the first place. In particular, the “negotiator” effect 
identified in our theory concerns unobserved heterogeneity.   
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We propose an additional test to further investigate this. If there is unobserved heterogeneity, we would 
expect it to show up in the error term of the Probit model in Table 3. For example, willingness to 
negotiate would increase the error term which leads to a higher probability of an equal split. While the 
true error is unobservable, we can proxy it with the difference between the realization (p = 0 or 1) and 
the predicted probability ( ̂). We call u=p- ̂ the unexpected component of the equal split, and note that 
higher values of u imply greater reluctance to negotiate.
22 We then decompose the coefficient of equal 
splits into its expected ( ̂) and unexpected (u) components and rerun the model of Table 5. Table 6 
reports the results, showing that the unexpected component is negative and statistically significant, while 
the expected component is highly insignificant. This is consistent with unobserved heterogeneity. 
Obviously we cannot say what exactly the unobserved heterogeneity is, but our theoretical model 
identifies one possible source: If some teams have better quality because of some unobservable keenness 
to negotiate, then they are likely to both obtain better valuations and negotiate equity shares among 
themselves.  
6.3. The role of negotiation speed 
Empirical Implication 6 considers the role of the negotiation process. The theory suggests that quick 
negotiation should be associated with equal splitting. Moreover, while quick equal splitters should have 
a lower valuation than non-equal splitters, this need not be true for slow equal splitters. Put differently, 
in the case of quick negotiations, our model makes a clear prediction, whereas in the case of long 
negotiations, it is ambiguous whether equal splits should be associated with higher or lower valuations. 
To empirically examine the role of negotiation speed, we first examine the relationship between quick 
negotiation and equal splits. From Table 1, Panel B we note that the two variables are positively 
correlated (p<0.01). In an unreported regression we confirm that this correlation continues to hold in a 
multivariate setting where we also control for all the independent variables for variables used in Table 









23 This validates the fundamental premise of our theory that equal splitting is associated with quick 
negotiations. 
To test Empirical Implication 6 we then examine whether the relationship between equal splits and 
valuation is affected by the speed of negotiation. In Table 7 we find that the negative relationship 
between equal splits and valuation appears to be driven by the quick negotiators: equal splitters who 
negotiate quickly have a negative and statistically significant coefficient (p<0.05), whereas equal 
splitters who reach an agreement after lengthy negotiations have a negative but insignificant coefficient. 
Note that the difference between the two coefficients is not statistically significant, so that we should 
remain somewhat cautious about the strength of the differential effect. Still, this provides at least some 
suggestive evidence of the differences between fast and slow equal splitters. This is consistent with 
Empirical Implication 6. 
 
Section 7: Non-pecuniary benefits of equal splitting 
7.1. Theoretical considerations 
So far in our analysis the main benefit of equal splitting is the avoidance of negotiation costs. There may 
also exist non-pecuniary benefits to equal splitting. Our empirical analysis already revealed that some 
teams agree to an equal split after lengthy negotiation. The results from Tables 5 and 7 do not indicate 
any valuation benefits of equal splitting, but there may be other ‘unobservable’ or ‘non-monetary’ 
benefits that we will now consider. 
To extend our theory, suppose there is a non-pecuniary benefit to equal splitting, denoted by b, which 
for simplicity is the same for all founders. After negotiation costs are sunk, all founders agree that an 
equal split is preferable to an unequal split whenever Max(Δi)≤b, otherwise they settle on the Nash-
Shapley solution. Prior to incurring negotiation costs a founder demands negotiation whenever δiπ > 
k+b. Thus the probability of equal splitting becomes θ = Πi=1,...,N[u+((k+b)/π)-Δi]/(2u)
N. It is immediate 
that the higher the benefit of equal splitting, the higher the probability of equal splitting, both at the ex-
post stage (slow negotiations) and the ex-ante stage (quick negotiations). This simple model extension 





shows that non-pecuniary benefits of equal splitting should not be viewed as an alternative theory, but as 
an extension of our basic model.
 24 
7.2: Equal splitting and control 
Let us consider the benefit of balancing control rights. In addition to allocating cash flow rights, shares 
also allocate voting rights.
25 The interesting difference is that there may be a threshold effect, where the 
value of owning shares jumps discreetly when a founder (or a subgroup of founders) crosses the 
majority threshold. Some teams may thus choose an equal split in order to avoid giving too much control 
to any one founder. Hauswald and Hege (2006) emphasize this argument in their analysis of joint 
ventures.  
The benefit of balancing voting rights is not directly observable, so we consider a number of indirect 
tests. We ask whether teams that split the equity equally also manifest a desire to balance control in 
other dimensions. Entrepreneurial teams allocate voting control through founder shares, but they also 
allocate control when they make decisions about executive positions and participation on the board of 
directors. We ask whether equal splitters are more likely to have executive teams where no single 
founder is chosen to be the CEO or to sit on the board of directors. The CEO-Balance (Board-Balance) 
variable equals 1 whenever either none or more than one founder is CEO (sits on the board).
26 
Table 2 shows that CEO-Balance is positively correlated with equal splitting, although the correlation is 
statistically insignificant (p<0.2). However, Board-Balance is strongly correlated and statistically 
significant (p<0.01). The t-tests in Table 1 reveal the same relationships. 
To further validate this relationship, we consider Probit regressions using the independent variables from 
Model 3 of Table 3 (using Models 1 or 2 yields similar results) plus the equal split dummy. Again we do 
not impose a causal interpretation on the estimated coefficients, but merely want to verify that the pair-
wise correlation survives in a multivariate environment. The results are reported in Table 8. We find that 









the equal split coefficient is positive and significant (p<0.05) for Board-Balance, and positive but 
marginally insignificant (p<0.13) for CEO-Balance.
27 Overall there is credible evidence that equal 
splitters are more likely to also balance board control, but only weak evidence that they balance CEO 
control. 
We called the benefit of balancing control a “private” benefit, implying that it has no direct impact on 
valuation. In unreported regressions we examine whether our measures of balanced control affect 




Non-pecuniary benefits may involve things other than control, so we now extend the argument for a 
more general preference for equality. A recent literature explores the economic importance of “other-
regarding preferences,” a.k.a. inequity aversion or altruism (see Bartling et al., 2007; Fehr et al., 1999, 
2006). Moreover, organizational scholars have long argued that equality within teams may promote 
better team cohesion and greater cooperation, especially within teams that operate under “social logics” 
(e.g., Adams, 1965; Leventhal, 1976). All these arguments suggest that some teams perceive other 
benefits of choosing equal allocations.  





















The empirical challenge is that preferences for equality are not directly measurable. However, one 
implication from these theories is that preferences for equality should not only affect the division of 
equity, but other team decisions, too. We already saw that equal splitters are more likely to balance 
certain control functions, most notably board participation. We now ask whether equal splitters are also 
more likely to adopt equal compensation packages. We focus on two central aspects of compensation, 
namely founder salary and target bonus.
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Table 2 shows that there is a positive and statistically highly significant (p<0.01) correlation between 
equal splitting and equal salaries, similar for the t-test in Table 1. Again we also consider a Probit 
regression for equal salaries, using the independent variables of Model 3 of Table 3 (using Models 1 or 2 
yields similar results), plus the equal split dummy. Table 8 shows that that the equal split coefficient is 
positive and highly significant (p<0.01), confirming that the correlation between equal splits and equal 
salaries continues to hold in a multivariate environment. We also obtain very similar results for our 
measure of equal bonus targets. These tests indicate that equal splitting is positively correlated with 
other dimensions of compensation equality, supporting the notion that teams that allocate founder shares 
equally also exhibit a more general preference for team equality. Note also that these findings refute a 
potential alternative hypothesis that founder systematically trade-off equal equity allocations against 
unequal compensation packages.  
Section 8: Estimating the value at stake 
When founders agree to an equal split, how much money is at stake? In some sense, this question cannot 
be answered, because all we know is that teams that split the equity equally chose to do so. Any counter-
factual estimates require bold assumptions and need to be interpreted with caution. We nonetheless find 
it worthwhile to provide a quantitative approximation of how costly the decision to split the equity 
equally might be. 
Appendix B provides a detailed explanation of our methods to generate counterfactuals. In essence, we 
use the regression for the share premia among unequal splitters (Model 3 of Table 4) to generate out-of-
sample predictions for the expected premium in the sample of equal splitters. We argue that this value 
can be thought of as an implied transfer of shares, because the decision to split the equity equally means 




that founders gave up the opportunity to receive their predicted share premia. To estimate average and 
median values of the implied transfer for each team, we focus on the absolute value of the predicted 
share premium. We then multiply this with a suitably chosen pre-money valuation to obtain the absolute 
premium value. This provides a dollar amount for the money at stake in the decision of whether to agree 
to an equal split. We also compare this premium value against the typical value of a founder stake.  
Our counterfactuals estimate what equal splitters might have done if they had chosen to split the equity 
unequally, in the way that typical unequal splitters would have done. In terms of our theory, we can 
think of this as an artificial lowering of the negotiation costs k, sufficient to induce at least one founder 
to ask for negotiation. Our counterfactuals hold the fundamental profitability (π) of the company 
constant. Practically, we do not change the valuation of equal splitters, i.e., we assume that their 
valuation discount, found in Table 5, remains intact.  
Table 9 presents results from the counterfactual exercise. It reports the mean and medians for three 
distinct calculations. The first pair of columns shows the estimates for the share premia. In the second 
pair of columns we multiply the share premia with the undiscounted pre-money valuation to obtain a 
simple estimate of the premium value. The third pair of columns uses a pre-money valuation discounted 
at 12.75%; the appendix provides an explanation for this choice of discount rate.  
The first row shows the predictions for equal splitters, the second row for unequal splitters. We note that 
the mean values are well above the median values. This is typical for value distributions of 
entrepreneurial companies, where the majority of companies have moderate valuations, but a few 
companies have large positive values that raise the average well above the median.  
The third row shows the actual premium values for unequal splitters. Comparing the second and third 
rows, we note a considerable difference between the actual and predicted share premium. The reason for 
this discrepancy is that the linear prediction model, while providing unbiased estimates of the average 
premium, severely underestimates the absolute premium. In the appendix we explain a method-of-
moments rationale of using a stretch factor. While this factor preserves the mean of the predicted value, 
it also matches the mean (or median) absolute deviation of the predicted value to the mean (or median) 
absolute deviation of the actual value, within the sample of unequal splitters. The fourth row reports the 
mean and median stretch factor. In the fifth row we apply the stretch factor to the absolute predicted  
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share premia among equal splitters. We find that the stretch factor has a large impact on the estimated 
premium values, raising the discounted premium value above $500K.  
Overall we note that the range of estimates for the value at stake with equal splitting varies from a low 
of $175,945 (median of the discounted value prediction) to a high of $788,637 (mean of the stretched 
value prediction). While we do not need to take a stance on which of these predictions is the most 
reasonable, we believe that the main insight from Table 9 is that the values at stake are substantial.
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Another way of assessing the value at stake is to compare the predicted premium values to the total 
value held by a typical founder. The sixth and seventh rows of Table 9 report the total value of shares 
held by the average or median founder. Rows eight to ten then show the relationship between the 
predicted premium value and this total share value. For equal splitters we find that the forgone premium 
value is worth between 17% - 40% of the total value of shares.  
The results of Section 6 already showed that equal splitting is associated with a valuation discount, 
amounting to approximately 10% of the valuation. The results in this section do not even consider this 
discount, but identify additional costs of equal splitting. At the risk of oversimplifying we average the 
basic and stretched estimates, and find that the economic value at stake seems to amount to 
approximately 10% (± 2%) of the firm equity, 25% (± 5%) of the average founder stake, or $450K (± 
$120K) in net present value. 
Section 9: Conclusion 
This paper is concerned with the first financial arrangement within a new firm, namely the division of 
founder shares. It opens the black box of financial relationships within founding teams, something that 
has received little attention in the prior literature. Arguably the division of equity is one of the key 
decisions taken by founder teams, yet we find a surprisingly high incidence of equal splitting. We 
develop a simple theory where founders have a choice between accepting an equal split without having 
to negotiate, or undertaking costly negotiations to come up with a differentiated allocation of equity 
shares. The theory generates several empirical predictions that are borne out in the data. Moreover, 
simple calculations suggest that the amount of money at stake is far from trivial. 




Future research might look into other aspects of the financial contracts among founders. One important 
area of research is examining to what extent founder financing is used as a substitute for external 
financing (see also Robb and Robinson (2009)). Another interesting set of issues revolves around the 
evolution of founder equity shares, and the use of founder vesting schedules that make the allocation of 
equity shares contingent on milestones. More generally, we believe that there is a benefit to exploring 




This figure shows the distribution of the share premia among the 1476 individual founders. The share premium is defined as the percentage equity 

























This table provides descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the analysis. Variables are defined in Appendix 1. The table reports the number of observations, mean value and standard deviations in the full sample, in 
the subsample of teams that split the equity equally, and in the subsample of teams that split the equality unequally. Panel A features all variables that vary at the level of individual-founders, Panel B those that vary at the 
level of the team. (D) means that the variable is a dummy variable; (L) means that the natural logarithm of the variable is reported. The last column reports the results of t-tests for the difference between the equal and unequal 
sample, where ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at confidence levels of 99%, 95% and 90% respectively. 
 
Panel A: Individual‐founder Level 
All Founders  Equal Split  Unequal Split  t-test 
Obs. Mean Std.  Dev.  Obs. Mean Std. Dev.  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.    
Share premium  1476  0.000  15.592  428 0.000  0.000  1048 0.000 18.507   
Serial entrepreneur (D)  1476  0.318  0.466  428 0.311  0.463  1048 0.322  0.467   
Prior years of work experience  1476  17.018 9.450  428  15.752 9.885 1048  17.534  9.222 *** 
Idea person (D)  1476  0.232  0.422  428 0.217  0.413  1048 0.238  0.426   
Founder capital invested  1476  0.055  0.113  428 0.059  0.111  1048 0.054  0.113   
 
CEO position  1476  0.294  0.456  428 0.332  0.471  1048 0.279  0.449  ** 
Chairman position  1476  0.045  0.208  428 0.044  0.206  1048 0.046  0.209   








   All Teams  Equal-split teams  Unequal-split teams  t-test 
  Obs. Mean Std.  Dev.  Obs. Mean Std. Dev.  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.    
Equal split  511  0.335  0.472  171  1.000 0.000  340  0.000 0.000  NA 
Team size  511  2.888  1.259  171  2.503 0.877  340  3.082 1.374  *** 
Team's CV of serial entrepreneurs  511  0.659 0.799  171  0.443 0.688 340  0.768  0.830  *** 
Team's CV of work experience  511  0.336 0.366  171  0.298 0.378 340  0.356  0.358  * 
Team's CV of idea people  511  0.408  0.694  171  0.258 0.551  340  0.484 0.746  *** 
Team's CV of founder capital invested  511  0.447 0.650  171  0.213 0.479 340  0.564  0.692  *** 
Team's mean # of serial entrepreneurs  511  0.337 0.353  171  0.334 0.388 340  0.339  0.335   
Team's mean work experience  511  16.795  7.958  171  15.779 8.785  340  17.306 7.469  ** 
Team's mean # of idea people  511  0.239  0.346  171  0.213 0.351  340  0.252 0.343  
Team's mean founder capital invested  511  0.058 0.095  171  0.060 0.101 340  0.057  0.092   
Prior work experience together  (D)  504 0.714  0.452  168 0.673 0.471  336  0.735 0.442  
Prior founding experience together (D)  498  0.189 0.392  167  0.174 0.380 331  0.196  0.398   
Friends-not-coworkers before founding (D)  496  0.375 0.485  167  0.347 0.478 329  0.389  0.488   
Related to each other (D)  494  0.107  0.310  167  0.138 0.346  327  0.092 0.289  
Quick negotiation (D)  446  0.469  0.500  153  0.608 0.490  293  0.396 0.490  *** 
Time to outside finance  400  1.375  2.581  130  1.097 1.447  270  1.951 3.969  ** 
Pre-money valuation (L)  298  1.219  1.053  92  1.013 1.270  206  1.312 0.928  * 
Geography: Canada (D)  511  0.047  0.212  171  0.064 0.246  340  0.038 0.192  
Geography: California (D)  511  0.321  0.467  171  0.304 0.461  340  0.329 0.471  
Geography: Massachusetts  511  0.170  0.376  171  0.164 0.371  340  0.174 0.379  
Industry: IT (D)  511  0.564  0.496  171  0.596 0.492  340  0.547 0.499  
Industry: Life Sciences (D)  511  0.313  0.464 171  0.304  0.461 340  0.318  0.466   
CEO-Balance (D)  511  0.174  0.380  171  0.205 0.405  340  0.159 0.366  
Board-Balance (D)  445  0.463  0.499  147  0.565 0.498  298  0.413 0.493  ** 
Equal salary (D)  279  0.301  0.460  94  0.457 0.501  185  0.222 0.416  *** 









   (1.) (2.) (3.) (4.) (5.) (6.) (7.) (8.) 
1.  Equal  split  (D)          
2.  Share  premium  0.00         
3. Serial entrepreneur (D)  -0.01  0.17***             
4. Prior years of work experience  -0.09***  0.05*  0.25***       
5. Idea person (D)  -0.02  0.14***  0.14***  0.11***      
6. Founder capital invested  0.02  0.18*** 0.20*** 0.23*** 0.06**       
7. CEO position (D)  0.05*  0.35***  0.18*** 0.02 0.12***  0.07**     
8. Chairman position (D)  0.00  0.12***  0.17*** 0.22*** 0.09*** 0.20*** -0.14***   
9. CTO position (D)  0.07**  -0.06*  -0.02  -0.07** -0.02** -0.06**  -0.27***  -0.09*** 










** * * *
-0.15 0.10 0.09
*** ** **
-0.26 0.08 0.19 0.09 0.12
*** * *** ** **
-0.12 0.15 -0.12 .12*
** *** ** **
-0.09 0.09 -0.29 0.26
** ** *** ***
0.29 0.11 0.16
*** ** ***
-0.11 0.19 0.17 0.24
** *** *** ***
0.24 0.09 -0.10 0.12 0.10
* * * * ** * * ** *
0.08 0.46 0.16 0.12 0.16 0.18
* *** *** ** *** ***
0.12 -0.16
** ***
.12* 0.12 0.13 0.12
** ** ** **
0.20 -0.21 -0.12 -0.08 0.11
*** *** ** * **
16. Time to outside finance 0.16 -0.09 -0.11 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.09 -0.06 -0.03 0.16 -0.01 -0.02 0.08 0.03 0.18
** ** *** ***
-0.13 0.13 -0.11 0.08        
** ** *




0.06 0.14 -0.10 -0.31
** ** ***
-0.08 0.09 -0.22 -0.20 -0.08 .11* -0.05
** ** *** *** * **
-0.10 0.23 0.28 -0.09 0.02 -0.77
** *** *** ** ***
0.06 0.04 0.08 -0.02 -0.07 0.01 -0.01 0.06 0.01 0.08 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.11 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 0.04 -0.13 0.16
* * ** ** ***
0.14 0.07 -0.04 0.04 0.01 -0.11 0.02 -0.08 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.04 0.03 -0.04 -0.09 0.03 -0.01 0.05 0.08 -0.14 0.03 -0.04 0.01
** ** * ***
0.24 -0.19 -0.11 0.04 -0.02 -0.11 -0.04 -0.10 -0.08 0.05 -0.10 -0.08 -0.02 -0.07 0.10 -0.06 -0.07 -0.01 0.01 -0.07 0.13 -0.12 0.08 0.26
*** *** * * * ** ** ***
0.14 -0.08 -0.01 0.01 0.13 -0.10 0.03 -0.03 -0.07 0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 -0.06 0.03 0.03 -0.07 -0.09 0.08 0.00 0.10 -0.14 0.11 0.19 0.53





25. Equal salary (D)
26. Equal Bonus Target (D)




X 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.01
-0.01
X
22. Industry: Life Sciences (D) -0.01 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.03 -0.01
-0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.05 -0.01 0.04
-0.06 0.00
21. Industry: IT (D)
0.05 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.07
-0.02 -0.01 -0.04 0.03 -0.04 -0.04
20. Geography: Mass. (D)
-0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.02 -0.05 0.04
-0.05 0.05 -0.05 0.05
X
0.01 -0.05 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02
0.02
X
19. Geography: California (D)
-0.03 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.04
-0.02 0.06 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01
X 18. Geography: Canada (D)
0.06 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.07
0.02 -0.05
X
0.06 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.05
17. Pre-money valuation (L)
0.08 0.00 -0.06 -0.09
0.00 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.03
X 15. Quick negotiation (D)
-0.05 -0.07 -0.05 0.00
-0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.04
X 14. Related to each other (D)
0.07 -0.07 -0.01 -0.04 0.02
0.07 0.06
X 13. Friends-not-coworkers before founding (D)
-0.04 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.02 -0.05 0.00
12. Prior joint founding exp’c (D)
-0.03 0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02
X
11. Prior work exp’c together (D)
-0.07 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02
X
10. Team's mean founder capital invested
0.02 -0.06 -0.02 -0.06 0.05
X
9. Team's mean # of idea people
-0.05 -0.05 -0.01 -0.04 0.00
X
8. Team's mean work experience
0.06 0.05 0.04
X
7. Team's mean # of serial entrepreneurs
-0.01 -0.02
X
6. Team's CV of founder capital invested X
5. Team's CV of idea people
-0.02
X
4. Team's CV of work experience X
3. Team's CV of serial entrep’s. X




This table reports the estimates from three Probit regressions where the dependent variable, called Equal split, takes the 
value 1 whenever a team splits the equity equally, 0 otherwise. The unit of analysis is a team. All independent variables 
are defined in Appendix 1. All four models control for team size (i.e., the number of founders), for geographic controls 
(California, Massachusetts, Rest of US and Canada) and for industry controls (information technology, life sciences and 
other) and for a set of dummy variables for the year when the founder split the equity. The four founder characteristics are 
whether a founder is a serial entrepreneur (i.e., has prior founding experience), the number of years of work experience 
before founding the venture, whether a founder came up with the idea on which the venture was based, and the amount of 
initial founding capital provided by the founder. Model 3 add the average team values and the heterogeneity measures for 
each of the four founder characteristics. Model 3 further adds four dummy variables about the prior relationships among 
the founders, namely whether any of the founders had worked together before founding the venture, whether any of the 
founders had founding a prior venture together, whether any of the founders had been friends but not co-workers before 
founding the venture, and whether any of the founders were related to each other. (D) means that the variable is a dummy 
variable; (L) means that the natural logarithm of the variable is reported. The table reports the coefficient estimate and its 








Dependent variable:  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 





































































































Number of Observation (Teams)  511 511 511
Prob > χ2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
















Dependent variable  Model 1: OLS  Model 2: Bootstrapped  Model 3: OLS  Model 4: Bootstrapped 
Share premium  Coef.   (S.E.)   Sig  Coef.   (S.E.)   Sig  Coef.   (S.E.)   Sig  Coef.   (S.E.)   Sig 
Serial entrepreneur (D)  8.877     (2.28) ***  7.785   (2.23)  ***  2.806    (2.13)  4.449    (2.18)  ** 
Work experience ‐ 0.113     (0.13) -0.132   (0.12) ‐ 0.239    (0.13)   *   -0.179    (0.11) 
Idea person (D)  14.986     (2.71) ***  9.975   (2.83)  ***  9.011    (2.50)   ***  6.647    (2.64)  ** 
Founder capital invested  71.988     (13.34) ***  65.326  (15.48)  ***  54.243   (12.58)   ***  49.205   (14.42)  *** 
CEO position (D)  0.000   (0.00)  ***  -0.408   (0.58)  19.860    (1.82)   ***  13.999    (1.79)  *** 
Chairman position (D)     21.504    (5.01)   ***  17.182    (5.26)  *** 
CTO position (D)  7.559    (2.14)   ***  6.323    (2.03)  *** 
Constant  0.000  (0.00)   ***  0.071  (0.00) 
  
Number of Observation  1048  708 1048 708
Number of Teams  340  340 340 340
Prob > F  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000







































































































This table reports the estimates from two OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the company’s pre-money 
valuation, measured at the time of the first external financing round, provided the round occurred within three years of the date of the equity split. 
The unit of analysis is a team. All independent variables are defined in Appendix 1. The key independent variables are the expected and 
unexpected components of the equal split decision. The expected component is given by the predicted probability of an equal split, derived from 
Model 4 of Table 3. The unexpected component is given by difference between the equal split dummy variable and the predicted probability of an 
equal split, derived from Model 4 of Table 3. All models control for team size (i.e., the number of founders), for the time elapsed (measured in 
years) between ate of the equity split and the date of the first external financing round; for geographic controls (California, Massachusetts, Rest of 
US and Canada) and for industry controls (information technology, life sciences and other) and for a set of dummy variables for the year when 
the financing round occurred. The four founder characteristics are whether a founder is a serial entrepreneur (i.e., has prior founding experience), 
the number of years of work experience before founding the venture, whether a founder came up with the idea on which the venture was based, 
and the amount of initial founding capital provided by the founder. Model 2 includes the average team value for each of the four founder 
characteristics, as well as heterogeneity measures for the four founder characteristics, namely the coefficient of variation within a team. It further 
adds four dummy variables about the prior relationships among the founders, namely whether any of the founders had worked together before 
founding the venture, whether any of the founders had founding a prior venture together, whether any of the founders had been friends but not co-
workers before founding the venture, and whether any of the founders were related to each other. (D) means that the variable is a dummy 
variable; (L) means that the natural logarithm of the variable is reported. The table reports the coefficient estimate and its associated robust 
standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at confidence levels of 99%, 95% and 90% respectively. 
 
Dependent variable:  Model 1  Model 2 
Premoney valuation (L)  Coef.   (S.E.)   Sig  Coef.   (S.E.)   Sig 
Expected component of equal split ‐ 0.136     (0.43) ‐ 0.627     (1.09) 
Unexpected component of equal split ‐ 0.326     (0.15)  ** ‐ 0.31     (0.16)  * 











This table reports the estimates from two OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the company’s pre-money 
valuation, measured at the time of the first external financing round, provided the round occurred within three years of the date of the equity split. 
The unit of analysis is a team. All independent variables are defined in Appendix 1. The key independent variable are Equal and quick split, 
which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 whenever a team splits the equity equally and reaches an agreement within a day or less, 0 
otherwise; Equal and slow split, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 whenever a team splits the equity equally but does not reach an 
agreement within a day or less, 0 otherwise; Unequal and quick split, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 whenever a team splits the 
equity unequally and reaches an agreement within a day or less, 0 otherwise. All models control for team size (i.e., the number of founders), for 
the time elapsed (measured in years) between ate of the equity split and the date of the first external financing round; for geographic controls 
(California, Massachusetts, Rest of US and Canada) and for industry controls (information technology, life sciences and other) and for a set of 
dummy variables for the year when the financing round occurred. The four founder characteristics are whether a founder is a serial entrepreneur 
(i.e., has prior founding experience), the number of years of work experience before founding the venture, whether a founder came up with the 
idea on which the venture was based, and the amount of initial founding capital provided by the founder. Model 2 includes the average team 
value for each of the four founder characteristics, as well as heterogeneity measures for the four founder characteristics, namely the coefficient of 
variation within a team. It further adds four dummy variables about the prior relationships among the founders, namely whether any of the 
founders had worked together before founding the venture, whether any of the founders had founding a prior venture together, whether any of the 
founders had been friends but not co-workers before founding the venture, and whether any of the founders were related to each other. (D) means 
that the variable is a dummy variable; (L) means that the natural logarithm of the variable is reported. The table reports the coefficient estimate 
and its associated robust standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at confidence levels of 99%, 95% and 90% respectively. 
 
Dependent variable:  Model 1  Model 2 
Premoney valuation (L)  Coef.   (S.E.)   Sig  Coef.   (S.E.)   Sig 
Equal and quick split ‐ 0.395  (0.20)  ** ‐ 0.469   (0.21)  ** 
Equal and slow split ‐ 0.228  (0.22) ‐ 0.293   (2.23) 






















Dependent variable:  CEO‐Balance (D)  Board‐Balance (D)  Equal Salary (D)  Equal Bonus Target (D) 
   Coef.   (S.E.)   Sig  Coef.   (S.E.)   Sig  Coef.   (S.E.)   Sig  Coef.   (S.E.)   Sig 
Equal split  0.238   (0.16)  0.358   (0.15)  **  0.851   (0.20)  ***  0.586   (0.20)  *** 
Team size  0.03   (0.06)  0.103   (0.07) ‐ 0.176   (0.13) ‐ 0.062   (0.08) 
Team's mean # of serial entrepreneurs ‐ 0.106   (0.25)  0.336   (0.22) ‐ 0.394   (0.32)  0.148   (0.30) 
Team's mean work experience ‐ 0.001     0.01   ‐0.008   (0.01) ‐ 0.011   (0.01)  0.001   (0.01) 
Team's mean # of idea people  0.05   (0.21) ‐ 0.057   (0.21) ‐ 0.230   (0.32) ‐ 0.335   (0.27) 
Team's mean founder capital invested  0.9920   (0.72)  0.135   (0.71)  3.035   (1.06)  ***  2.352   (0.98)  ** 
Team's CV of serial entrepreneurs  0.174   (0.09) ‐ 0.067   (0.09) ‐ 0.093   (0.13) ‐ 0.007   (0.12) 
Team's CV of work experience ‐ 0.256   (0.22)  0.208   (0.20)  0.311   (0.30)  0.434   (0.29) 
Team's CV of idea people ‐ 0.145   (0.12)  0.052   (0.10)  0.223   (0.15)  0.540   (0.14)  *** 
Team's CV of founder capital invested  0.058   (0.12) ‐ 0.220   (0.11)  ** ‐ 0.096   (0.16) ‐ 0.287     0.14   ** 
Prior work experience together (D) ‐ 0.136   (0.17)  0.130   (0.16) ‐ 0.182   (0.23) ‐ 0.176   (0.21) 
Prior founding experience together (D)  0.035   (0.21)  0.136   (0.19) ‐ 0.106   (0.30) ‐ 0.312   (0.27) 
Friends‐not‐coworkers before founding (D) ‐ 0.043   (0.15)  0.047   (0.14) ‐ 0.122   (0.20) ‐ 0.111   (0.19) 
Related to each other (D)  0.188     0.23   ‐0.250   (0.22) ‐ 0.645   (0.31)  ** ‐ 0.386   (0.29) 
Geography, industry and split‐year dummies  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Constant ‐ 1.105   (0.38) ‐ 0.058   (0.37) ‐ 0.958   (0.51) ‐ 0.644   (0.49) 
  
Number of Observation (Teams)  490  428  273  273 
Prob > F   0.183  0.003  0.000  0.001 






Counterfactuals     Shares  Value  Discounted value 
   (Row)  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median 
Absolute premium calculation 
Prediction for equal splitters  1  7.94%  7.47%  $374,860  $207,150  $333,491  $175,945 
Prediction for unequal splitters  2  8.98%  8.01%  $518,588  $295,292  $479,327  $274,227 
Actual for unequal splitters  3  13.66%  10.00%  $733,550  $338,333  $677,371  $317,079 
Stretched calculation 
Stretch factor  4  1.52  1.25 
Prediction for equal splitters ‐ stretched  5  12.07%  9.32%  $788,637  $368,745  $570,065  $258,678 
Total value 
Equal splitters  6  39.95%  50.00%  $1,965,174  $1,100,000  $1,736,192  $1,000,000 
Unequal splitters  7  32.44%  30.00%  $1,763,421  $1,040,000  $1,628,499  $963,018 
Premium as a fraction of total value 
Prediction for equal splitters  8  19.87%  14.94%  19.08%  18.83%  19.21%  17.59% 
Prediction for equal splitters ‐ stretched  9  30.21%  18.64%  40.13%  33.52%  32.83%  25.87% 
Actual for unequal splitters  10  42.11%  33.33%  41.60%  32.53%  41.59%  32.93% 
Number of observations 
Number of founders ‐ equal splitters  428  235  235 
Number of founders ‐ unequal splitters  1048  643  643 
Number of teams ‐ equal splitters  171  92  92 
Number of teams ‐ unequal splitters     340  206  206  
[43] 
 
Appendix 1. Variable Definitions 
 




The percentage of equity received by each 
founder as a result of the equity-split 
negotiation, minus the amount that would 
have been received if the equity had been 
split equally 
“% of company's equity received at 
time of initial equity split” and 





Dummy variable for whether all founders 
received (did not receive) the same amount of 
equity 
(Calculated from Premium variable) 
Duration of 
negotiation 
The elapsed time over which the founders 
negotiated the equity split, categorized by: 1 
day or less, 2 days to 2 weeks, 2 weeks to 2 
months, 2 months to 6 months, More than 6 
months 
“How much time did the founders 




Dummy variable for whether the founders 
negotiated the equity split quickly, using 
various cutoffs for short durations 
(Calculated from Duration variable) 
Slow 
negotiation 
Dummy variable for whether the founders 
negotiated the equity split for a long time, 
using various cutoffs for long durations 




Whether the founder had prior founding 
experience; dummy variable 
“Previously founded another 
company?” 
Prior years of 
work 
experience 
Number of years of prior work experience 
before founding the venture 
“Years of work experience before 
founding this company” 
Idea person  Whether the founder came up with the idea 
on which the venture was based; dummy 
variable 




Amount of initial founding capital provided 
by the founder, categorized by: $0k, $1k - 
$25k, $26k - $100k, $101k - $500k, More 
than $500k 
“Amount of founding capital 
contributed by this founder” 
CEO position  Whether the founder received the CEO 
position at time of founding 




Whether the founder received the Chairman 
position at time of founding 
“Initial position in the company 
[Chairman choice]” 
CTO position  Whether the founder received the CTO 
position at time of founding 
“Initial position in the company [CTO 
choice]” 
Team-level Variables 





Whether any of the founders had worked 
together before founding the venture 
“Before founding this company, how 
many of the founders had previously 
worked together?”  
[44] 
 




Whether any of the founders had founding a 
prior venture together 
“Before founding this company, how 
many of the founders had founded 




Whether any of the founders had been friends 
but not co-workers before founding the 
venture 
“Before founding this company, how 
many of the founders were friends but 
not co-workers?” 
Related to each 
other 
Whether any of the founders were related to 
each other 
“Before founding this company, how 




The venture’s pre-money valuation in its first 
round of outside financing, if raised within 3 
years (note: sensitivity to this cutoff tested 
for robustness) 
“Round 1: Pre-investment valuation 
($M)” [also includes questions about 
participants in the round] 
Round 1 date  Date that first outside round of financing 
closed (if round raised) 
“Round 1: Approximate date of 
completion” 
Geography, Industry, and Year Dummies 
Geography 
dummies 




The venture’s industry: Technology vs. Life 
Sciences (also collected: primary and 
secondary industry segments) 
“Please select one primary as well as a 




Dummy variables capturing the year in which 
the founding team split the equity 




Dummy variables capturing the year in which 
the venture raised it first round of outside 
capital 
“Round 1: Approximate date of 
completion” 
Balanced Control and Compensation Assessments 
CEO-Balance  Dummy variable that equals 1 if none of the 
founders assume the position of CEO, or if 
two or more founders share the CEO title; 0 
otherwise. 
(Calculated based on “Initial position 
in the company” answers across the 
founding team) 
Board-Balance  Dummy variable that equals 1 if (at the time 
of the survey) none of the founders sit on the 
board, or if two or more founders sit on the 
board; 0 otherwise.   
(Calculated based on answers to “Does 
this executive sit on the board” across 
the team) 
Equal-Salaries  Dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
remaining founders (at the time of the 
survey) received equal salaries; 0 otherwise. 
(Calculated based on earliest “Annual 
base salary” answers across the team) 
Equal-Bonus-
Target 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
remaining founders (at the time of the 
survey) received equal bonuses; 0 otherwise. 
(Calculated based on earliest “Cash 





Appendix 2. Description of Counterfactual Methodology 
Our counterfactual calculations assume that, contrary to their revealed choice, teams that split 
equally negotiate a non-equal split, using the same ‘principles’ as unequal splitters. In terms of 
theory, our counterfactual exercise effectively looks at a scenario where we replace the true 
negotiation costs k with a counterfactual negotiation cost k that is sufficiently low so that at least 
one founder always wants to negotiate. Put differently, our counterfactual calculation examines 
what would happen if a team with an unobservable preference for equal splits were to change its 
mind and suddenly exhibit a preference for negotiating an uneven allocation of equity. 
If equal splitters were to split the equity unevenly, some founders would receive more and others 
fewer shares. We call an implied transfer the difference between the value of shares that a 
founder receives under an equal split minus the value of shares that the founder would have 
received under the counterfactual of an unequal split. The implied transfers within a team always 
sums to zero, because one founder’s implied gain is another founder’s implied loss. To obtain an 
idea of the size of these transfers we focus on the absolute values of the implied transfers.
31 
To construct a counterfactual share premium we use the information from the sample of non-
equal splitters to make an out-of-sample prediction for the equal splitters. Specifically, we use 
the linear predicted values of Model 3 in Table 4 to construct predicted values for the sample of 
equal splitters.  
To calculate the absolute premium value, we consider both undiscounted and discounted 
valuations. The specific choice of discount rates is always a contentious issue. We use a 
pragmatic approach, noting that the valuation model of Table 5 effectively estimates a discount 
rate. The coefficient for the time-to-finance variable is 0.12. Since the valuation is measured as a 
natural logarithm, this implies a continuous time discount rate of 12%, or an annual discount rate 
of Exp(0.12) ≈ 12.75%.  
 








Table 8 shows that the average (median) absolute share premium amounts to 7.94% (7.47%) of 
the company. We compare this counterfactual value for equal splitters with the results for the 
non-equal splitters, where the average (median) is 8.98% (8.01%). For the sample of non-equal 
splitters, we can also calculate the actual average (median) absolute premium, given by 13.66% 
(10%) as shown in Table 8. We note that the actual premium is considerably higher than the 
predicted premium. The predicted value of the OLS model correctly estimates the mean of the 
distribution, which is always zero in this model. However, due to its “averaging logic,” the 
predicted values from the OLS model are likely to underestimate the variance of the underlying 
distribution. As a consequence it might be argued that they underestimate the implied transfers.  
A “method-of-moments logic” would suggest using a prediction model that fits not only the 
mean of the distribution, but also its dispersion. One can construct several such estimators, but 
for brevity’s sake we focus on one such approach. We note that the ratio of the actual and 
predicted average (median) absolute share premium is 1.52 (1.25), as shown in the fifth row. We 
therefore propose a “stretched” linear prediction model where the predicted values are multiplied 
by the stretch factor of 1.52 (or 1.25 for median). Since the expected values in our model are 
always zero, the same remains true for the “stretched” linear prediction model, thus guaranteeing 
that the predicted share premium remains unbiased. In addition, the stretched predicted share 
premium has the property that, in the sample of non-equal splitters, the predicted absolute share 
premium exactly equals the actual absolute share premium. Table 8 shows how this impacts the 
average (median) absolute predicted share premium for equal splitters. The predicted average 
(median) share premium rises to 12.07% (9.32%). As a consequence, the predicted average 
(median) premium value rises to $570,065 ($258,678). 
Rows 6 and 7 in Table 8 report the total shares and total share value for the average (median) 
founder, broken down by equal versus non-equal splitters. These numbers in turn allow us to 
provide an idea of how big the implied transfers are. In particular we can compare the predicted 
absolute share premia against the total shares held by a typical founder. These calculations are 
shown in rows 8, 9 and 10. 
We performed three additional sets of calculations not reported in Table 8. First we examined 
how sensitive the results were to the discount rate. We doubled the discount rate to 0.24 in log 
terms (or Exp(1.24) ≈ 27.13%) and found that the predicted premium values fell by another 10- 
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12%. Second, we consider the impact of missing valuations. We used a simple linear prediction 
model to generate predicted valuations for all companies that obtained some outside financing. 
Specifically we regressed the valuation on all control variables of Model 2 in Table 5, except 
that, due to missing financing dates for companies with unreported valuations, we dropped the 
time to finance variables and replaced the financing year dummies with founding year dummies. 
We then redid all the calculations but found that the predicted absolute discounted premium 
value was within 1% of the estimates reported in Table 8.  
Our counterfactual calculations rest on several strong assumptions. By construction our predicted 
values take into account the observable differences between equal and unequal splitters. 
However, our predictions do not take into account unobservable differences between these two 
subgroups. Put differently, the assumption that equal splitters would split the equity using the 
rules of the non-equal splitters allows us to make the counterfactual comparison. However, it is a 
strong assumption, so we caution against too literal an interpretation of these counterfactual 
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